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SCIENCE CHINA Information Sciences, Volume 60, Issue 4: 048102(2017) https://doi.org/10.1007/s11432-016-0233-0

Low-cost design of stealthy hardware trojan for bit-level fault attacks on block ciphers

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  • ReceivedApr 10, 2016
  • AcceptedAug 12, 2016
  • PublishedJan 21, 2017

Abstract


Acknowledgment

Acknowledgments

This work was supported in part by National Basic Research Program of China (973 Program) (Grant No. 2013CB338004), National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 61173191, 61272491, 61309021, 61472357, 61571063), Zhejiang University Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (Grant No. 2015QNA5005), and Science and Technology on Communication Security Laboratory (Grant No. 9140C110602150C11053).


References

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