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SCIENCE CHINA Information Sciences, Volume 59, Issue 9: 092209(2016) https://doi.org/10.1007/s11432-016-5532-x

Dynamics and stability for a class of evolutionary games with time delays in strategies

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  • ReceivedOct 26, 2015
  • AcceptedDec 18, 2015
  • PublishedAug 23, 2016

Abstract

This paper investigates the modeling and stability of a class of finite evolutionary games with time delays in strategies. First, the evolutionary dynamics of a sequence of strategy profiles, named as the profile trajectory, is proposed to describe the strategy updating process of the evolutionary games with time delays. Using the semi-tensor product of matrices, the profile trajectory dynamics with two kinds of time delays are converted into their algebraic forms respectively. Then a sufficient condition is obtained to assure the stability of the delayed evolutionary potential games at a pure Nash equilibrium.


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