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SCIENTIA SINICA Informationis, Volume 46 , Issue 11 : 1569-1590(2016) https://doi.org/10.1360/N112016-00114

Public data evolution games on complex networks and data quality control

Wenqi LIU 1,2,*
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  • ReceivedJun 5, 2016
  • AcceptedAug 2, 2016
  • PublishedNov 9, 2016

Abstract

A public database is a special kind of public goods in which data quality control involves solving some basic problems in public management science at the interface with data science. A public database network is a complex body with some physical objects associated with each other (a visible system) and some partners of the public data game (an invisible system); the quality of public data is reflected synthetically by the database technology and evolution of the public data game. From the viewpoint of public goods management, the availability of data in public databases depends on the cooperation evolution of the public data game for same data cleansing technology. The Chinese public data network is regarded as a scale-free complex network on which the corresponding data game is an evolutionary game. Using the models of a prisoner's dilemma game and extended prisoner's dilemma game, the existence of an evolutionary stable strategy is discussed for the public data game. With the theoretical modeling of complex network analysis, it is further regarded that the collaborators of the public data evolution game would survive on the scale-free complex network, and that cooperative strategy even becomes a stable strategy of the public data evolutionary game through strong punishment or by returning all fines to the punisher. The corruption sub-game model of the public data evolutionary game is established to analyze the influence of the punisher's corruption. By constructing the corruption sub-game model, the rights of the data auditor are beneficial for cooperative behavior to survive, and when the stronger rights of the auditor would result in total corruption. Finally, we discuss the extent to which information disclosure and freedom of media help to limit the rights of the public auditor, while helping the cooperator and loyal punisher to irrupt, such that the cooperator's survival increases to improve the data quality in public databases.


Funded by

国家自然科学基金(61573173)

国家自然科学基金(61562050)

国家自然科学基金(11561036)


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