SCIENTIA SINICA Informationis, Volume 48 , Issue 2 : 177-186(2018) https://doi.org/10.1360/N112017-00112

Unorganized malicious attacks detection

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  • ReceivedMay 16, 2017
  • AcceptedMay 31, 2017
  • PublishedJan 15, 2018


Recommender system has attracted much attention during the past decade. However, collaborative filtering as a usual technique is vulnerable to malicious attacks that generate fake profiles to manipulate the system. Prior research has shown that attacks can significantly affect the robustness of the systems. Thus, many attack detection algorithms have been developed for better recommendation. Most previous approaches focus on organized malicious attacks, where the attack organizer fakes many user profiles using the same strategy to promote or demote an item. In this study, we analyze a different attack style: unorganized malicious attacks, where attackers fake a small number of user profiles to attack the same target item without any organizer. This attack style occurs in many real applications, which can significantly affect the robustness of a recommender system, yet relevant studies are inadequate. We conduct extensive experiments to study the performance of state-of-the-art attack detection approaches in unorganized malicious attack detection and discuss different approaches regarding their performance. Experimental results show that existing attack detection approaches cannot detect unorganized malicious attacks efficiently. By explaining the inefficiency of these attack detection approaches and the characteristics of unorganized malicious attacks in detail, we provide a possible research direction to develop new detection schemes for unorganized malicious attack detection.

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  • Figure 1

    General form of an attack profile

  • Figure 2

    (Color online) Effectiveness of unorganized malicious attacks. (a) Prediction shift; (b) hits

  • Figure 3

    (Color online) Detection (a) precision and (b) recall on MovieLens 100K under unorganized malicious attacks. The spam ratio varies from 0.02 to 0.2

  • Table 1   Detection precision, recall and $F1$ on MovieLens under unorganized malicious attacks based on traditional strategies
    MovieLens 100 KMovieLens 1 M
    $P$ $R$ $F$1 $P$ $R$ $F$1
  • Table 2   Detection precision, recall and $F1$ on MovieLens which are under general unorganized malicious attacks
    MovieLens 100 KMovieLens 1 M
    $P$ $R$ $F$1 $P$ $R$ $F$1
  • Table 3   Detection precision, recall and $F1$ compared with other algorithms on dataset Douban 10 K
    RPCA N-P k-means PCAVarSel MF-based

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