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This work was supported by National Key Research and Development Program of China (Grant No. 2017YFA0303903), National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 62072270), National Cryptography Development Fund (Grant Nos. MMJJ20170121, MMJJ20180101), and Zhejiang Province Key RD Project (Grant No. 2017C01062).
Appendix A.
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| $\alpha$ | $\beta$ | Attacked round | Time complexity |
| $a$ | 9 | $2^{29}$ | |
| $a$ | $b$ | 10 | $2^{29}$ |
| $c$ | 9 | $2^{29}$ | |
| 8 | $2^{29}$ | ||
| $a$ | 9 | $2^{42}$ | |
| 10 | $2^{63}$ | ||
| 11 | $2^{97}$ | ||
| 9 | $2^{29}$ | ||
| $b$ | $b$ | 10 | $2^{42}$ |
| 11 | $2^{63}$ | ||
| 12 | $2^{97}$ | ||
| 8 | $2^{29}$ | ||
| $c$ | 9 | $2^{42}$ | |
| 10 | $2^{63}$ | ||
| 11 | $2^{97}$ | ||
| $a$ | 10 | $2^{29}$ | |
| $c$ | $b$ | 11 | $2^{29}$ |
| $c$ | 10 | $2^{29}$ |
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